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A DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTY OF DISCLOSURE:  THE CASE(S) AGAINST 
 
 
BETH NOSWORTHY*  
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
Directors owe a significant number of duties to their company – at common 
law, in equity and according to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations 
Act’). Within the field of equity, the director-company relationship is recognised 
as founding a presumption of a fiduciary obligation flowing from the director to 
the company. Despite High Court authority and significant academic debate as to 
the precise and proscriptive content of this obligation in equity, over the past two 
decades case law has emerged suggesting that directors owe a ‘fiduciary duty of 
disclosure’. With appropriate and timely disclosure being an important element 
of corporate governance, and imposed through a variety of other well-recognised 
and widely-debated mechanisms, close inspection of this development is 
warranted. 
This article undertakes a detailed analysis of the first case to raise the duty, 
Fraser v NRMA Holdings Ltd.1 Through careful consideration of that case and 
the authorities it cites, this article argues that there has either been a conflation of 
the words ‘equity’ and ‘fiduciary’ or, more likely, a misstatement of the only 
defence available to a challenge of fiduciary breach – that of fully informed 
consent. The article charts the cases which follow Fraser v NRMA, and confirms 
that the disclosure discussed is either grounded in equity more generally, or 
specifically as a defence to a claim of breach of fiduciary obligation. 
 
II   DIRECTORS’ DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS 
Disclosure is clearly required of directors through sections 191(1), 195 and 
208 of the Corporations Act, although the precise scope and nature of the 
disclosure required remains a current issue.2 It also exists indirectly through the 
                                                 
*  BSc (Ma&CompSc), DipLang, Hons LLB, GDLP, BCL (Oxon), PhD. Lecturer, Adelaide Law School, 
University of Adelaide. An early version of this article was presented at the Corporate Law Teachers’ 
Conference in 2016, and I am grateful for the comments and feedback provided, and to the valuable 
suggestions of the anonymous reviewers. 
1  (1995) 55 FCR 452 (‘Fraser v NRMA’). 
2  See, eg, Duncan v Independent Commission Against Corruption (2014) 311 ALR 750. 
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application of sections 180–3 of the Corporations Act.3 A number of other Acts 
which can regulate the behaviour of directors also require disclosure, such as  
the Australian Consumer Law, section 18.4  Despite the variety of legislative 
provisions regarding disclosure, a number of decisions have chosen to consider a 
fiduciary duty of disclosure, which has led to the examination which takes place 
in this article. 
In order to examine the potential for a positive fiduciary duty of disclosure, it 
is necessary to first refer to the long-lived debate as to the precise nature of 
fiduciary obligations under Australian law. This article will briefly canvas the 
position of fiduciary obligations in current law and, in particular, their role in the 
director-company relationship, before turning to the broader argument as to the 
particular impact of the High Court decision in Breen v Williams. 5  There is 
debate as to whether the judgment in Breen v Williams intended to: first, 
disapprove a broad prescriptive fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the 
beneficiary; secondly, more generally require fiduciary obligations to be 
proscriptive in nature with no further restriction; or thirdly, to recognise only the 
obligations to avoid profits and conflicts.6 In light of this uncertainty, the mooted 
fiduciary duty of disclosure warrants closer attention, as under the first or second 
categories above, it might survive scrutiny despite initially appearing at odds 
with the current mainstream of fiduciary law. The three cases which have been 
seen as affirming this concept in particular are Fraser v NRMA, ENT Pty Ltd v 
Sunraysia Television Ltd,7 and Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Fernandez,8 
which this article will examine in particular. These cases appear to indicate an 
expansion of the accepted proscriptive fiduciary obligations by establishing a 
positive obligation on directors to disclose information in certain circumstances. 
There is no question that such a positive obligation can be found within the 
Corporations Act: for example, in relation to disclosure for related party 
transactions in sections 218–19, and the penalty for providing false information is 
clear in section 1309. Further, there is no debate that disclosure on the whole can 
be a mechanism for effective corporate governance.9 However, the discussion 
here focuses on the questionable labelling of the duty as ‘fiduciary’, and whether 
the cases do in fact argue for such an obligation. 
 
                                                 
3  The precise scope and nature of the disclosure required under those provisions is also an ongoing 
question before the courts: see, eg, Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Soust (2010) 183 
FCR 21; Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Soust [No 2] (2010) 78 ACSR 1. 
4  The Australian Consumer Law is contained in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2. 
5  (1996) 186 CLR 71. 
6  See, eg, Rosemary Teele Langford, ‘The Duty of Directors to Act Bona Fide in the Interests of the 
Company: A Positive Fiduciary Duty? Australia and the UK Compared’ (2011) 11 Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies 215, 228; see generally J D Heydon, M J Leeming and P G Turner, Meagher, Gummow and 
Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2015) 210 [5-380] ff. 
7  (2007) 61 ACSR 626 (‘ENT v Sunraysia’). 
8  (2010) 81 ACSR 262 (‘CBA v Fernandez’). 
9  Ian M Ramsay and Richard Hoad, ‘Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices by Australian 
Companies’ (1997) 15 Company and Securities Law Journal 454, 456. 
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III   THE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION 
Significant scholarly work has been dedicated to the fiduciary obligation 
within Australian law,10 and although this article does not mean to replicate it, a 
brief overview is necessary. The current ‘accepted mainstream’ of the fiduciary 
obligation revolves around the duties of good faith imposed to exact standards of 
good conduct from persons unable to deal with each other at an arm’s length due 
to their relationship.11 As the relationship between the parties plays a pivotal role 
in attracting the supervision of equity through the fiduciary obligation, it has 
been said that the obligation itself may vary depending on the nature of the 
underlying relationship.12 
Although the relationship plays a pivotal role in attracting the supervision of 
equity through the fiduciary obligation, a finding that one party is a fiduciary 
does not consequently mean that all or potentially any other obligations arising 
from the relationship will be fiduciary in nature.13 This is central to the issue this 
article considers. 
As yet, there is no universally accepted definition of which relationship will 
attract fiduciary obligations,14  nor a universally accepted test for determining 
when a fiduciary obligation will attach to a relationship.15 Instead, the courts list 
relationships which have been accepted as including fiduciary obligations in the 
past and which give rise to a presumption of fiduciary obligations,16 and deal with 
new relationships by drawing analogies to that list. Despite valid and 
longstanding criticisms of this ‘list method’,17 it remains the approach of choice 
for the High Court.18 
                                                 
10  P D Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Law Book, 1977) is one of the first texts dedicated to the obligation, 
which has been recognised in the courts since the 1700s, from early English decisions such as Keech v 
Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61; 25 ER 223, to recognition in Australia in Moss v Moss [No 2] (1900) 21 
LR (NSW) Eq 253, and in depth treatment in the High Court of Australia in Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 
CLR 178, Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41 (‘Hospital Products’) 
and Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71. See also Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Themes and Prospects’ in P D 
Finn (ed), Essays in Equity (Law Book Co, 1985) 242; P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G 
Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell, 1989) 1; Matthew Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty: 
Protecting the Due Performance of Non-Fiduciary Duties (Hart Publishing, 2010). 
11  Finn, Fiduciary Obligations, above n 10, 78. 
12  Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178, 195 (Deane J).  
13  The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] (2009) 225 FLR 1, 493 (Owen J). 
14  Ibid 489 (Owen J). At least one academic argues that, according to case law, the outcome is not uncertain 
at all – it is simply a matter of courts and then later academics failing to articulate a coherent conceptual 
position: Robert Flannigan, ‘The Core Nature of Fiduciary Accountability’ [2009] New Zealand Law 
Review 375, 400. 
15  For example, whether it is a legal response to the causative events of consent or the commission of a 
wrong under Birks’ taxonomy as discussed by Mitchell McInnes, ‘Taxonomic Lessons for the Supreme 
Court of Canada’ in Charles Rickett and Ross Grantham (eds), Structure and Justification in Private 
Law: Essays for Peter Birks (Hart Publishing, 2008) 77. 
16  See, eg, Hospital Products (1984) 156 CLR 41, 68 (Gibbs CJ), 96 (Mason J). 
17  Ernest J Weinrib, ‘The Fiduciary Obligation’ (1975) 25 University of Toronto Law Journal 1, 5; Michael 
Kirby, ‘Equity’s Australian Isolationism’ (2008) 8 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice 
Journal 444, 457–8. 
18  John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1, 34–5 (The Court). 
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Pertinent to this discussion, since the decision of Hospital Products  
the director-company relationship is recognised as founding a presumption  
of fiduciary obligations.19 Parties to relationships which are considered to be 
analogous to those contained within the list, such as officer-company,20 promoter-
company, or new relationships entirely, can still find themselves bound by 
fiduciary obligations on an ad hoc basis.21  
The presumption created by the existence of the relationship that there is a 
fiduciary obligation owed is a rebuttable one. Finn also cautions that being 
fiduciary for one obligation is not ipso facto fiduciary for all, or potentially any, 
other obligations,22 and that the finding of a fiduciary relationship only marks the 
beginning of the enquiry.23 This is eminently logical. 
 
A   The Content of the Fiduciary Obligation 
The formulation of the fiduciary obligation itself is also not entirely without 
controversy,24 although the ‘bedrock of the two negative principles’25 is generally 
accepted. A person who owes a fiduciary obligation to another (‘the fiduciary’) 
must not place themselves in a position where their personal interests or duties 
conflict with, or may possibly conflict with, the interests of the person to whom 
the duty is owed (‘the beneficiary’),26  nor may they secretly profit from the 
relationship.27 These prohibitions are known more colloquially in Australian law 
as the ‘no conflict’ and ‘no profit’ rules. It is not necessary for the fiduciary to act 
mala fide to breach the ‘no conflict’ rule, which maintains the strict nature the 
obligation derives from its early sources, removing the fruit of temptation 
entirely rather than merely moving it to a higher shelf.28 
                                                 
19  (1984) 156 CLR 41, 68 (Gibbs CJ), 96 (Mason J); Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources 
Ltd [1989] 2 SCR 574, 597 (Sopinka J). 
20  Which can arguably fall into another nominate category as well, that of employee-employer: C & KA 
Flanagan Sailmakers Pty Ltd v Walker [2002] NSWSC 1125, [44] (Macready AJ). There is some debate 
as to whether or not employee-employer falls on the nominate category list. The majority of 
commentators and the High Court in both Hospital Products (1984) 156 CLR 41, 96 (Mason J), 141 
(Dawson J) and John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1, 35 (The 
Court) included that relationship on the status-based list (contra G E Dal Pont, Equity and Trusts in 
Australia (Lawbook, 5th ed, 2011) 111–12). For officer-company, see also Canadian Aero Service Ltd v 
O’Malley (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371, 381 (Laskin J); Avtex Airservices Pty Ltd v Bartsch (1992) 107 ALR 
539, 560–2 (Hill J); Minlabs Pty Ltd v Assaycorp Pty Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 509, 517 (Roberts-Smith J). 
21  Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in liq) (2012) 301 ALR 1. 
22  Finn, Fiduciary Obligations, above n 10, 2. 
23  Paul Finn, ‘Fiduciary Law and the Modern Commercial World’ in Ewan McKendrick (ed), Commercial 
Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (Clarendon Press, 1992) 7, 37. 
24  See, for example, the discussion on the proscriptive/prescriptive debate which follows. 
25  Charles Harpum, ‘Fiduciary Obligations and Fiduciary Powers – Where Are We Going?’ in Peter Birks 
(ed), Privacy and Loyalty (Oxford University Press, 1997) 145, 147. 
26  This party is sometimes referred to as ‘the principal’: see, eg, Blackmagic Design Pty Ltd v Overliese 
(2011) 191 FCR 1 (‘Blackmagic Design v Overliese’); Langford, ‘The Duty of Directors’, above n 6.  
27  Moss v Moss [No 2] (1900) 21 LR (NSW) Eq 253, 258 (Simpson CJ in Eq). Although the two concepts 
emerge separately from the case law, they are collectively known as the fiduciary obligations. 
28  Leonard I Rotman, Fiduciary Law (Thomson Carswell, 2005) 64. 
2016 A Directors’ Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure 1393
As the obligation is formulated to protect the beneficiary, the fiduciary may 
be excused by obtaining fully informed consent from the beneficiary,29 either 
prior to a potential breach, or via retrospective absolution.30 The onus of proving 
the beneficiary’s fully informed consent naturally rests on the fiduciary.31 It is 
this defence to a claim of breach that is at the heart of the issue raised in cases 
like Fraser v NRMA and addressed by this article. The remedies for a breach of a 
fiduciary obligation include the traditional equitable remedies of injunction, 
constructive trust, account of profits, rescission, tracing and equitable 
compensation. 
Although the bedrock of two negative principles is generally accepted,  
there is a great deal of debate as to whether fiduciary obligations impose 
proscriptive (negative) duties or prescriptive (positive) duties.32 The High Court 
in Breen v Williams, one year after the decision in Fraser v NRMA, emphasises 
that in Australia fiduciary duties are proscriptive or prohibitive in nature.33 One 
commentator interprets this as the Court marking a line between the domain of 
contract and tort law on the one hand, and the fiduciary obligation on the other.34 
To impose fiduciary obligations in a prescriptive manner would place a positive 
duty to act in the interests of the person to whom the duty is owed, which  
the Court deems undesirable for a fiduciary obligation. 35  Another sees the  
two proscriptive duties described above as the method of ensuring  
effective performance of the prescriptive duties of fiduciaries, such as the  
general obligation to act in the best interests of the beneficiary.36 Currently, the 
position propounded in High Court authority is that fiduciary obligation is a  
form of negative assurance or protection, in that it prohibits the fiduciary from 
acting inconsistently with the interests of the beneficiary of the duty.37 There is 
academic support for this judicial reasoning, founded not only on the practical 
                                                 
29  See, eg, Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46, 93 (Viscount Dilhorne), 104 (Lord Cohen), 109 (Lord 
Hodson), 117 (Lord Guest).  
30  Bamford v Bamford [1970] Ch 212, 238 (Harman LJ); Winthrop Investments Ltd v Winns Ltd [1975] 2 
NSWLR 666, 672 (Glass JA). In relation to timing of consent, and commercial knowledge, see also 
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, 138–9 (The Court). 
31  Maguire v Makaronis (1997) 188 CLR 449, 466–7 (Brennan CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow J). 
32  See generally Heydon, Leeming and Turner, above n 6, 210–18 [5-380]–[5-400]. 
33  (1996) 186 CLR 71, 113 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ), 95 (Dawson and Toohey JJ). See also Aequitas Ltd v 
AEFC Leasing Pty Ltd (2001) 19 ACLC 1006; Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165, 
197–9; Fitzwood Pty Ltd v Unique Goal Pty Ltd (in liq) (2001) 188 ALR 566; Youyang Pty Ltd v Minter 
Ellison Morris Fletcher (2003) 212 CLR 484; Australian Securities and Investment Commission v 
Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd [No 4] (2007) 160 FCR 35; Friend v Booker (2009) 239 
CLR 129; Blackmagic Design v Overliese (2011) 191 FCR 1. 
34  Dal Pont, above n 20, 99–100. 
35  Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 95 (Dawson and Toohey JJ), 113 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ). See 
also Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165, 198 (McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and 
Callinan JJ). 
36  See generally Conaglen, above n 10. See especially: at 59–105, 185–7. 
37  See above n 33 for a list of authority. A similar position is developing within the Canadian Supreme 
Court, seeking to ‘debunk the view, arguably open on some of the language appearing in [their] case law, 
that fiduciary duties equate to a duty to act in [the beneficiary’s] best interests’: Dal Pont, above n 20, 
146. Contra the English position under the Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 172(1), which is suggested 
to be reflective of a fiduciary obligation: Langford, ‘The Duty of Directors’ above n 6, 223–4. 
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difficulty of ex ante constraints on conduct which can be performed in a  
variety of unobjectionable ways,38 but also on the potentially ‘chilling effect on 
entrepreneurial activity that imposing strict duties of care and skill would have 
and to avoid the uncertainty of application that imposing broad prescriptive 
duties would involve’.39 Analysis of the Bell Group cases suggests that, along 
with many academics, the intermediate courts are prepared to query the rigidity 
of this proscriptive/prescriptive distinction.40 Consideration of positive fiduciary 
obligations arose in those decisions because the liquidators sought to rely on 
Barnes v Addy41 to recover money received by banks who had enforced their 
securities when various companies within the Bell Group were placed into 
liquidation. Barnes v Addy permits liability for a breach of trust to be extended to 
those who either knowingly receive trust property or knowingly assist in a breach 
of trust.42 It has been ‘assumed, but rarely if at all decided’, that this ability to 
make a third party liable for breach is not limited to breach of trust alone, but that 
it extends to fiduciary breach more generally.43 It does not, however, extend to 
non-fiduciaries, and so the Court was required to determine whether the duties 
breached by the directors were fiduciary in nature, thereby attracting the remedial 
approach of Barnes v Addy. Owen J at first instance, and the Court of Appeal in 
three separate judgments, were prepared to find various positive duties of the 
directors fiduciary, and consequently permit the liquidator to utilise a Barnes v 
Addy argument against the banks who had notice of the directors’ breaches.44 The 
Bell Group litigation settled in the same month that the scheduled appeal was to 
be heard in the High Court,45 leaving the position in Breen v Williams unchanged 
as binding authority in favour of proscriptive duties. This remains a particular 
hurdle for a fiduciary duty of disclosure as expressed in Fraser v NRMA. 
 
B   The Director as Fiduciary 
The current position regarding the fiduciary obligation owed by directors to 
the corporation flows from the historical development of the corporate form. The 
precursor to the modern company was the joint stock company, which was 
                                                 
38  R C Nolan, ‘The Legal Control of Directors’ Conflicts of Interest in the United Kingdom: Non-Executive 
Directors Following the Higgs Report’ (2005) 6 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 413, 422–3. 
39  Andrew Tuch, ‘Obligation of Financial Advisors in Change-of-Control Transactions: Fiduciary and Other 
Questions’ (2006) 24 Company and Securities Law Journal 488, 496. 
40  The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] (2009) 225 FLR 1, [4574]–[4582] 
(Owen J); Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [No 3] (2012) 270 FLR 1, [921], 
[932] (Lee AJA), [1956], [1978] (Drummond AJA), [2728], [2733] (Carr AJA). See also Duncan v 
Independent Commission Against Corruption [2016] NSWCA 143, [620]–[624] (Basten JA). 
41   (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244. 
42  Ibid 251–2 (Lord Selborne LC). 
43  Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, 141 [113] (The Court). See also, 
Heydon, Leeming and Turner, above n 6, 219 [5-405]. There is no High Court authority to confirm, in 
ratio, that the two limbs of Barnes v Addy apply beyond a breach of trust. 
44  It is beyond the scope of this particular article to consider the approaches of the four judgments in detail. 
See generally Heydon, Leeming and Turner, above n 6, 219–23 [5-405]–[5-425]. 
45  Richard Gluyas, ‘Banks in Bell Group Settlement’, The Australian (online), 18 September 2013 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/financial-services/banks-in-bell-group-settlement/story-
fn91wd6x-1226721294746>. 
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legally a partnership. The stockholders were status fiduciaries to each other under 
either of two traditional analyses: partners were deemed to be agents of one 
another and therefore attracted fiduciary obligations, or they attracted fiduciary 
obligations because they were joint principals in a business undertaking.46 When 
joint stock companies assumed corporate status, this naturally changed the legal 
circumstances, including the basis for fiduciary obligations. Upon incorporation, 
a new legal person entered the relationship – the company. The stockholders 
were no longer principals in relation to the business; their ‘partner’ status was 
replaced with ‘shareholder’ status as defined by statute. This transformation 
shifted contractual and vicarious liability to the new corporate entity, granting the 
shareholders limited liability in companies of that form, with the company now 
contracting as principal and assuming responsibility for the torts of its 
employees. It also erased the fiduciary obligations that the former stockholders 
had owed to each other upon their conversion to statutory investors of equity 
capital in the business of the corporation.47  Managing partners, who became 
directors of the company, continued to owe fiduciary obligations to the owner of 
the business, which was now the company. Consequently there is still a fiduciary 
obligation owed by those who act on behalf of another. All that has changed is 
the identity of the party to whom those obligations are owed. 
The management of the company is typically vested in a board of directors.48 
It is argued that it is because the powers of management and control of the 
company’s affairs and its assets are vested in its directors, that the law imposes 
statutory, common law and equitable duties upon those directors.49 The company 
director is ‘undoubtedly’ a holder of fiduciary office, which attracts the 
application of fiduciary obligations to their behaviour.50 But the beneficiary to 
whom the director owes fiduciary obligations is the company.51 
Finn places the rationale for equity’s supervision of directors on the basis of 
their autonomy: ‘The freedom which they enjoy in their decision-making, the 
lack of direct control by their respective beneficiaries, has attracted Equity’s 
supervision’.52  This sentiment is also voiced by Laskin J from the Canadian 
Supreme Court in Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O’Malley: 
Strict application [of fiduciary obligations] against directors and senior management officials is simply recognition of the degree of control which their positions give them in corporate operations, a control which rises above day-to-
                                                 
46  Robert Flannigan, ‘Fiduciary Duties of Shareholders and Directors’ [2004] Journal of Business Law 277, 
279. 
47  Ibid 279–80. 
48  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 198A (a replaceable rule). 
49  Julian Svehla, ‘Director’s Fiduciary Duties’ (2006) 27 Australian Bar Review 192, 192. 
50  Finn, Fiduciary Obligations, above n 10, 8. 
51  See, eg, Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421, 426 (Swinfen Eady J), although the principle has been 
present since Aberdeen Railway Company v Blaikie Brothers (1854) 1 Macq 461. There are accepted 
exceptions to this position: where directors explicitly hold themselves out as agents of the shareholders; 
where a director purchases shares from a shareholder; where a company is about to be wound up; 
improper use of the share issue power; and in closely held companies: Beth Nosworthy, ‘Directors’ 
Fiduciary Obligations: Is the Shareholder an Appropriate Beneficiary?’ (2010) 24 Australian Journal of 
Corporate Law 282, 298–9. 
52  Finn, Fiduciary Obligations, above n 10, 3. 
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day accountability to owning shareholders and which comes under some scrutiny only at annual general or at special meetings.53 
Another justification is suggested by Spigelman CJ, discussing the ability of 
the directors to dispose of company property as being justification to apply the 
same stringent test with respect to the exercise of fiduciary power to dispose of 
property as is applied to trustees of a traditional trust.54 This analysis is perhaps 
simply a specific example of the first justification above, as discussed by Mason 
J in Hospital Products: 
The relationship between the parties is therefore one which gives the fiduciary a special opportunity to exercise the power or discretion to the detriment of that other person who is accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his position.55 
This discussion of whether it is a question of autonomy, access to property, 
or vulnerability which attracts equity’s attention to the director is simply a 
reconsideration of the earlier debate as to the fundamental principle underlying 
all relationships where a fiduciary obligation operates. Ultimately, it is 
recognised at law in Australia that directors are within the accepted nominate 
categories in which fiduciary obligations are owed.56 Further, as noted above, 
outside of the nominate categories a number of similar relationships regularly 
attract fiduciary obligations, catching high level employees such as officers of the 
company, and persons acting, but not officially appointed as, directors.57 
 
IV   FRASER V NRMA 
Fraser v NRMA concerned a booklet of information distributed to the 
members of two companies limited by guarantee which were to undergo a 
complex demutualisation to convert from companies operated for the mutual 
benefit of their members, to corporations limited by shares.58 The companies 
concerned were sizeable, in both membership and asset value. The membership 
of NRMA Ltd was over 1.8 million, with assets valued at over $457 million. The 
membership of the second company limited by guarantee, NRMA Insurance Ltd, 
was over 1.3 million members with assets under its control valued at over $4.401 
                                                 
53  Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O’Malley [1974] SCR 592, 610. 
54  O’Halloran v RT Thomas & Family Pty Ltd (1998) 45 NSWLR 262, 277. This is also discussed as the 
foundation for a category of fiduciary obligations: see L S Sealy, ‘Fiduciary Relationships’ (1962) 
Cambridge Law Journal 69, 64. Analogies are often made between directors and trustees, but this has 
been criticised as a distraction: Flannigan, ‘Fiduciary Duties of Shareholders and Directors’, above n 46, 
284; Robert Flannigan, ‘The Adulteration of Fiduciary Doctrine in Corporate Law’ [2006] Law Quarterly 
Review 449, 450–1. 
55  (1984) 156 CLR 41, 97. 
56  Ibid 68 (Gibbs CJ), 96 (Mason J). In other jurisdictions, see, eg, Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona 
Resources Ltd [1989] 2 SCR 574, 597 (Sopinka J). 
57  Including executive and non-executive directors, de facto and shadow directors, and officers of the 
company: R P Austin, H A J Ford and I M Ramsay, Company Directors: Principles of Law and 
Corporate Governance (LexisNexis, 2005) 213–23. 
58  (1995) 55 FCR 452, 455–6 (The Court). 
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billion.59 The booklet distributed to the members emphasised that conversion to a 
company limited by shares would ‘permit members to share in the wealth and 
future financial successes of the organisation’ through the provision of ‘Free 
Shares’, and provided little by way of detail regarding the different bodies to be 
demutualised, or the rights and benefits of their membership prior to 
demutualisation which would be surrendered in exchange for the ‘Free Shares’.60 
The contents of that booklet, and what it omitted, were found at first instance to 
be misleading and deceptive under the then section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth).61 
On appeal, the Full Federal Court engaged in a discussion of the disclosure 
required from directors, including its source at law, and breadth once operational. 
The Court held that, as part of the fiduciary duties owed by directors to the 
company and its members62 in relation to proposals to be considered in general 
meeting, there is a fiduciary duty to provide such material information as will 
fully and fairly inform members of what is to be considered at the meeting.63 
Further, the proper discharge of this fiduciary duty may require that the directors 
take reasonable steps to ascertain relevant information to give to the members if 
that information is not already known to the board, and they must not consciously 
refrain from seeking such information, nor be wilfully blind to such material 
which contradicts or qualifies any position advocated for by the directors.64 This 
statement sits distinctly at odds with the wider understanding of the content of 
the fiduciary obligation in Australian law. 
The Full Federal Court commences the discussion of disclosure required 
from directors – including its source at law and breadth once operational – with 
reference to the ‘Bulfin v Bebarfald’s duty’, an equitable duty to make proper and 
accurate disclosure to the members, most particularly where the interests of the 
directors may be adverse to those of the members whom they are advising.65 In 
the case from which that duty emanates, Long Innes CJ, sitting in equity, makes 
no mention of it being fiduciary in nature. If this were the original source of law 
for a ‘fiduciary duty of disclosure’, it seems unlikely that his Honour, as a judge 
sitting in an equitable jurisdiction (which still existed as a separate jurisdiction in 
New South Wales at that time) would have failed to mention or discuss this fact. 
The court in Fraser v NRMA then finds 
[a] duty to make disclosure of relevant information arises as part of the fiduciary duties of the directors to the company and its members in relation to proposals to be considered in general meeting … The fiduciary duty is a duty to provide such 
                                                 
59  Ibid 455 (The Court). 
60  Ibid 458–9 (The Court). 
61  Ibid 460–2 (The Court). The equivalent provision is now found in the Australian Consumer Law as 
contained in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2.  
62  In general, fiduciary obligations will be owed to the company, and not to the members, according to 
Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421. However, in limited circumstances, including when the directors are 
providing advice to the members, the obligation may extend beyond the company to the members more 
generally, which is a question that goes beyond the scope of this particular article. 
63  Fraser v NRMA (1995) 55 FCR 452, 466 (The Court). 
64  Ibid. 
65  Bulfin v Bebarfald’s Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 423, 429, 432 (Long Innes CJ in Eq). 
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material information as will fully and fairly inform members of what is to be considered at the meeting and for which their proxy may be sought.66 
There is no immediate citation at that point of the judgment, but further on in 
the same paragraph, the Court relies on a history of United Kingdom and 
Canadian cases.67  
None of these early cases cited by the Full Federal Court directly discuss a 
‘fiduciary’ duty to disclose relevant information.68 The cases do discuss such a 
duty existing at equity, but the words ‘fiduciary’ and ‘equitable’ are not 
interchangeable.69 This article will now examine the authorities cited by the Full 
Federal Court in detail, to determine whether they support the proposition of a 
fiduciary duty to disclose. 
 
A   Jackson v Munster Bank 
The first authority is that of Jackson v Munster Bank.70 This Irish case makes 
no mention of the word ‘fiduciary’ at all, let alone a ‘fiduciary’ duty of 
disclosure. The case concerns a circular published to convene a meeting of the 
shareholders at which resolutions would be proposed to alter the articles of 
association, authorising advances to the directors and increasing the remuneration 
of the directors. It included proxy forms drawn in favour of two of the directors. 
The plaintiffs alleged that the directors sought to indemnify themselves against, 
and obtain release from, breaches of trust which they had committed.71 
The circular was held to contain statements by which the shareholders may 
have been misled and which were calculated to obtain proxies from the 
shareholders without their having the information which would enable them to 
form a just judgment as to whom to entrust their votes.72 The Vice-Chancellor 
specifically notes here, that ‘when a Chairman of a Company thinks proper to do 
an unnecessary act, namely, to make a commentary on the Resolutions which the 
Directors are about to bring forward … it should be a fair and candid 
commentary’.73 
 
                                                 
66  (1995) 55 FCR 452, 466 (The Court).  
67  Jackson v The Munster Bank (Ltd) (1884) 13 LR Ir 118 (‘Jackson v Munster Bank’); Tiessen v Henderson 
[1899] 1 Ch 861; Peel v London and North Western Railway Company [1907] 1 Ch 5; Baillie v Oriental 
Telephone and Electric Co Ltd [1915] 1 Ch 503; Pacific Coast Coal Mines Ltd v Arbuthnot [1917] AC 
607; Goldex Mines Ltd v Revill [1974] 7 OR (2d) 216 (‘Goldex’). The cases are cited as a list, with only 
one extracted quotation from the final authority mentioned, Goldex [1974] 7 OR (2d) 216, further down 
the same page. 
68  This could arguably be due to their age, but as all cases post-date the 1850s, by which time ‘fiduciary’ 
could be found in fairly common use, this is not a strong argument in favour of a ‘fiduciary duty of 
disclosure’. 
69  This would be similar to treating the words ‘tort’ and ‘negligent’ as interchangeable. 
70  (1884) 13 LR Ir 118. 
71  Ibid 130. 
72  Ibid 134 (Vice-Chancellor Chatterton). 
73  Ibid 137. 
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B   Tiessen v Henderson 
The second authority the Federal Court relies upon is Tiessen v Henderson.74 
The case makes no mention of a ‘fiduciary’ duty on the part of directors to 
disclose an interest to the shareholders. Instead, Kekewich J in Chancery holds 
that 
the application of the doctrine in Foss v Harbottle to joint stock companies involves as a necessary corollary the proposition that the vote of the majority at a general meeting, as it binds both dissentient and absent shareholders, must be a vote given with the utmost fairness – that not only must the matter be fairly put before the meeting, but the meeting itself must be conducted in the fairest possible manner.75 
Justice Kekewich discusses the disclosure of a director’s interest in the 
context of the fact that a shareholder may prudently leave matters in which they 
are not personally interested to the decision of the majority; but that in order to 
do so, they must have been given sufficient information to have a fair chance of 
determining in their own interest whether they are, in fact, disinterested.76 Facts 
not stated in this circular include that two directors of the company were to have 
a large proportion of shares on which there was to be a call in favour of the 
guarantors, and that the guarantors were to be some of the directors of the 
company, and that they would derive a personal benefit from this.77 
 
C   Peel v London and North Western Railway Company 
Peel v London and North Western Railway Company78 is the third authority 
Fraser v NRMA considers. This judgment, on appeal from Chancery, concerns 
whether it is proper for the company to pay the expenses of printing, posting and 
stamping a circular and proxies sent out by the directors prior to the half-yearly 
general meetings. The Court of Appeal discusses the duty of the directors to 
inform the shareholders of the facts, their policy, and the reasons why they 
consider that this policy should be supported by the shareholders in a general 
meeting, and holds that it is proper that the cost of distributing this material be 
borne by the company.79 The judgments, particularly of Vaughan Williams LJ 
and Fletcher Moulton LJ, find a positive duty on the directors to take care that a 
sufficient statement of the facts and opinions of the directors be made available 
to the shareholders, particularly if they perceive a danger that the corporation will 
take a step which may be injurious to the corporation. 80  Again, there is no 
discussion which elevates this to the level of a fiduciary duty to inform the 
shareholders. 
 
                                                 
74  [1899] 1 Ch 861. 
75  Ibid 866. 
76  Ibid 866–7. 
77  Ibid 870. 
78  [1907] 1 Ch 5.  
79  Ibid 12, 14 (Vaughan Williams LJ), 16–17 (Fletcher Moulton LJ), 18–19 (Buckley LJ). 
80  Ibid 13–14 (Vaughan Williams LJ), 16 (Fletcher Moulton LJ). 
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D   Baillie v Oriental Telephone and Electric Co Ltd 
The fourth authority, another appeal from Chancery, Baillie v Oriental 
Telephone and Electric Co Ltd,81 again contains no reference to a fiduciary duty 
of disclosure. It concerns an extraordinary general meeting convened in a parent 
company to ratify the alteration of articles of association of a subsidiary company 
which had occurred some six years earlier. The alterations increased the 
remuneration of the directors and gave them a percentage of the net profits. The 
meeting would also authorise the directors to retain the profits received, and to 
alter the articles of the parent company to allow the directors to receive 
remuneration from subsidiary companies without being accountable, and to 
exercise voting powers in those companies as they saw fit. The very substantial 
amount of remuneration received by the directors is not disclosed to the 
shareholders in the notice of meeting, the circular accompanying the notice, nor 
when the chairman addresses the issue at the meeting itself. The Court of Appeal 
holds that there is a requirement for full and frank disclosure to the shareholders 
of the facts upon which they are asked to vote, but does not find that this flowed 
from a fiduciary obligation.82 The special resolutions which had been obtained at 
the meeting could not be supported, as the sanction of the shareholders had not 
been sought and given on a fair and reasonably full statement of the facts.83 
 
E   Pacific Coast Coal Mines Ltd v Arbuthnot 
Pacific Coast Coal Mines Ltd v Arbuthnot84 is the fifth authority, and again 
discusses the need to put the shareholders in a position to judge for themselves 
whether or not to adopt a resolution at a special meeting, without indicating any 
fiduciary obligation. Here, the Privy Council on appeal from the Court of Appeal 
in British Columbia, advises that resolutions to consent to buying out the shares 
of the directors and releasing them from liability for any claims are ineffective 
due to the absence of proper notice putting each shareholder in a position to 
judge whether or not to consent.85 
 
F   Goldex Mines Ltd v Revill 
The sixth and final authority the Federal Court relies upon in Fraser v NRMA 
is Goldex.86 The Ontario Court of Appeal finds that ‘[w]here information is sent 
to shareholders that is untrue or misleading, the duty to shareholders is breached, 
whether the senders were required by statute to send out that class of information, 
or whether they simply chose to do so’.87 Interestingly, this finding is made in the 
context of deciding whether or not the plaintiff shareholders had standing to 
bring a class action against the corporation and other shareholders with adverse 
                                                 
81  [1915] 1 Ch 503. 
82  Ibid 514 (Lord Cozens-Hardy MR), 518 (Swinfen Eady LJ). 
83  Ibid 514–15 (Lord Cozens-Hardy MR). 
84  [1917] AC 607. 
85  Ibid 618 (The Court). 
86  [1974] 7 OR (2d) 216. 
87  Ibid 224. 
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interests. The quote extracted above comes under the heading, ‘The right to 
sue’,88 and appears to be the Canadian response to the proper plaintiff doctrine  
in Foss v Harbottle.89 This judgment in itself seems to suffer from a similar 
condition to the judgment in Fraser v NRMA: the conflation of ‘duties arising 
under equity’ and ‘fiduciary obligations’ as being one and the same.90 
The Federal Court in Fraser v NRMA91 cites the discussion undertaken by the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in Goldex of the previous Ontario case of Charlebois  
et al v Bienvenu 92  which ranged across the two concepts. Justice Fraser in 
Charlebois finds that calling an annual meeting and electing directors after the 
directors send out a misleading information circular is a breach of the directors’ 
fiduciary duty to the company. The Court in Goldex then declares that 
such an act is also a breach of duty to other shareholders. If the directors of a company choose, or are compelled by statute, to send information to shareholders, those shareholders have a right to expect that the information sent to them is fairly presented, reasonably accurate, and not misleading.93 
Although the misleading circular is a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duty 
to the company, the Court does not clearly state that it is also a breach of a 
fiduciary duty the directors owe to the shareholders – merely a breach of duty. A 
fiduciary for one obligation is not ipso facto a fiduciary for all, or potentially any, 
other obligations which are owed.94 
There is mention of fiduciary obligations within Goldex, but it does not assist 
in relation to this discussion. After moving on from the discussion of Charlebois, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Goldex states: 
The principle that the majority governs in corporate affairs is fundamental to corporation law, but its corollary is also important – that the majority must act fairly and honestly. Fairness is the touchstone of equitable justice, and when the test of fairness is not met, the equitable jurisdiction of the Court can be invoked to prevent or remedy the injustice which misrepresentation or other dishonesty has caused. The category of cases in which fiduciary duties and obligations arise is 
not a closed one …95 
Until the last sentence, this statement clearly echoes the United Kingdom 
cases relied upon by the Federal Court in Fraser v NRMA, particularly the 
judgment of Kekewich J in Tiessen v Henderson.96 The reference by the Goldex 
Court in the emphasised sentence to categories of cases in which fiduciary 
obligations arise comes as a surprise, given the quoted context. Fiduciary 
obligations, of all equitable concepts, have little to do with concepts of fairness, 
                                                 
88  Ibid 220. 
89  (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189. 
90  However, the Canadian courts have generally been prepared to allow the fiduciary obligation a more 
proactive role, including prescriptive action, but this has more generally been found in other relationships 
than commercial ones: see, eg, parent-child and Indigenous person-Crown, as discussed in Dal Pont, 
above n 20, 156–8. 
91  Although it is misspelled as ‘Charlebois et al v Bienveau’ in the Federal Court judgment: Fraser v NRMA 
(1995) 55 FCR 452, 466 (The Court). 
92  [1967] 2 OR 635 (‘Charlebois’). 
93  Goldex [1974] 7 OR (2d) 216, 223. 
94  Finn, Fiduciary Obligations, above n 10, 2. 
95  [1974] 7 OR (2d) 216, 224 (emphasis added). 
96  [1899] 1 Ch 861, 866. 
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and in no way rely on the kind of misrepresentation or mala fides the Ontario 
Court of Appeal was discussing immediately prior to this sentence. 97  It can 
potentially be concluded that this reference to fiduciary obligations is a reference 
back to the earlier discussion of directors’ fiduciary obligations in Charlebois, 
from which the Court concluded there was a breach of duty to the shareholders, 
rather than suggesting that misrepresentation and dishonesty are directly linked to 
the fiduciary obligation. 
 
G   Conclusions on Fraser v NRMA 
As can be seen, the cases the Federal Court refers to in Fraser v NRMA do 
not present a clear and unambiguous development of a concept of a ‘fiduciary 
duty of disclosure’, and ought not to be relied upon as such.98  They are all 
extraterritorial judgments.99 Five of them do not refer to such a duty as ‘fiduciary’ 
in any context, and the lone case which does use the word fiduciary in proximity 
to a discussion of a duty to the shareholders does not clearly identify this 
particular duty as fiduciary in nature, or attempt to provide any appropriate 
etymology for such a claim. 
It is also not a case of a new development being only partially supported by 
previous cases: if read in the light suggested, Fraser v NRMA would 
inappropriately convert waiver into a prescriptive duty. Four of the cited cases do 
clearly involve behaviour by directors for which the company could have sued 
for breach of both the ‘no profit’ and ‘no conflict’ rules,100 raising the potential 
for the directors to seek the defence of fully informed consent. However, the 
consent that they have sought, and in many of the cases received, was found by 
the courts to be of a lesser standard than fully informed, perhaps leading the 
courts to discuss the need for full and frank disclosure without overtly 
referencing the defence. 
A careful analysis of the cases cited clearly shows the misconception of the 
‘fiduciary duty to disclose’ which has arisen as a result. In light of the true nature 
of these decisions, it is difficult to accept that a duty to make disclosure of 
relevant information to the shareholders arises as part of the fiduciary obligation 
of the directors to the company. This is particularly so given that there was no 
discussion beyond mere citation for all but one of the six authorities presented by 
the Court immediately following that statement.101 This concern for correct use of 
                                                 
97  See, eg, that the bona fides of the fiduciary provides no protection from breach: Boardman v Phipps 
[1967] 2 AC 46; and that fairness has not been suggested as a basis for the fiduciary obligation: 
Nosworthy, above n 51, 288–9. 
98  Contra Rosemary Teele Langford, ‘ENT Pty Ltd v Sunraysia Television Ltd: A Positive Fiduciary Duty of 
Disclosure’ (2008) 26 Company and Securities Law Journal 470, 470.  
99  That is not to disparage the utility of foreign judgments, but it does lessen the impact of a seemingly long 
string of authority. 
100  Jackson v The Munster Bank (1884) 13 LR Ir 118; Tiessen v Henderson [1899] 1 Ch 861; Baillie v 
Oriental Telephone and Electric Co Ltd [1915] 1 Ch 503; Pacific Coast Coal Mines Ltd v Arbuthnot 
[1917] AC 607. 
101  Fraser v NRMA (1995) 55 FCR 452, 466. As mentioned above, the Federal Court did quote a short 
extract from Goldex [1974] 7 OR (2d) 216, where that court discussed the case of Charlebois [1967] 2 
OR 635. 
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authority should not be read as an argument that equity is incapable of bearing 
children,102 particularly within this field, but is a plea that if a child is to be born, 
there should at least be some discussion about and appropriate justification of the 
‘miracle’103 of its birth. 
 
V   POST FRASER V NRMA 
With the High Court decision in Breen v Williams the following year, it 
might seem that the fiduciary duty of disclosure, briefly enlivened in Fraser v 
NRMA, could no longer be supported under Australian law. Indeed, there was no 
rush to take up arms for the ‘fiduciary duty of disclosure’ after Fraser v NRMA, 
perhaps due to that very fact. The consequent decisions revisiting the issue of 
fiduciary obligations in each decade since Breen v Williams continue to uphold 
the position that the obligation is proscriptive in nature.104 These decisions have 
broad academic support.105 However, this does not mean that this misconception 
was consequently overcome or forgotten. The next decision to reassert the 
‘fiduciary duty of disclosure’ comes 12 years later in ENT v Sunraysia, and is 
followed three years later by CBA v Fernandez. By contrast, the following year 
the Full Federal Court in Blackmagic Design v Overliese refuses to find a 
fiduciary duty of disclosure,106 in a judgment which, excluding revisitation by the 
High Court, perhaps lays the matter to rest.  
 
A   ENT v Sunraysia 
ENT v Sunraysia 107  focuses on whether the directors of Sunraysia made 
sufficient disclosure to the members in relation to the sale of that company’s 
main undertaking, Swan TV. The directors unanimously recommend the sale to 
shareholders in an Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Notice of 
General Meeting, at which the shareholders are expected to vote on the sale.108 
The Court ultimately finds that the material provided to the shareholders is 
deficient with respect to the ‘material information that the ordinary shareholder 
needs to have in order to decide whether to approve the sale proposal, and would 
expect to be provided with’.109 
                                                 
102  Adapting the metaphor used in the 2008 W A Lee Equity Lecture by Michael Kirby, originally coined by 
Lord Denning: Kirby, above n 17, 452–3. 
103  The word miracle is not used lightly, given Kirby’s discussion under the heading ‘Hostility to Invention 
and Expansion’: ibid 453–64. 
104  Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165; Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd 
(2007) 230 CLR 89; Friend v Booker (2009) 239 CLR 129; John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City 
Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1. 
105  See Langford, above n 6, 228 n 63. 
106  (2011) 191 FCR 1, 23 [109] (Besanko J). 
107  (2007) 61 ACSR 626. 
108  Ibid 630 (Austin J). 
109  Ibid 644 (Austin J). 
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In reaching that conclusion, the Court discusses the ‘director’s duty of 
disclosure’, 110  as it was contended by the plaintiff that there should be an 
injunction granted to halt the meeting process because the directors of Sunraysia 
had not discharged the ‘Bulfin v Bebarfald’s duty’.111 Although, as discussed 
above, Bulfin v Bebarfald’s Ltd makes no mention of the duty being fiduciary in 
nature, after raising this duty the judgment in ENT v Sunraysia then proceeds  
to the ‘fiduciary obligation of the directors’ 112  by considering the case of 
Chequepoint Securities Ltd v Claremont Petroleum NL,113 and in particular the 
words of McLelland J: 
Where directors take it upon themselves to urge or recommend or advise members to exercise their powers in general meeting in a particular way, they are in general required to make a full and fair disclosure of all matters within their knowledge which would enable the members to make a properly informed judgment on the matters in question …114 
Here, McLelland J rephrases the ‘Bulfin v Bebarfald’s duty’ more broadly 
than the original case, in order to apply it to circumstances where directors 
volunteer advice or an opinion to members. Not only does McLelland J also not 
label the duty as fiduciary, but only contends that there is a requirement ‘in 
general’, and not even specifically in equity.115 
The finding in ENT v Sunraysia of a positive fiduciary duty of disclosure is in 
conflict with the judgment of the High Court in Breen v Williams. Although the 
judgment refers back to Fraser v NRMA to establish the existence of a positive 
fiduciary obligation, 116  it does not acknowledge the intervening High Court 
decision of Breen v Williams. Conaglen infers that the Court’s labelling of the 
duty to make full disclosure when recommending a course of action to their 
shareholders as fiduciary was not an intention to challenge the authority of Breen 
v Williams,117 but the judgment has been discussed as authority for that precise 
point. The remainder of the judgment in ENT v Sunraysia discusses the 
reasonable limits which must be placed on any such duty of disclosure, and does 
not raise any controversy. 
 
B   CBA v Fernandez 
The description of a positive ‘fiduciary duty of disclosure’ appears again 
three years after ENT v Sunraysia in CBA v Fernandez.118 The case deals with 
irregularities around the first meeting of creditors in a voluntary administration, 
and while considering whether the administrator is compliant with his duties, the 
                                                 
110  Ibid 630 (Austin J), quoting the heading in the judgment, although ‘fiduciary duty of full and fair 
disclosure’ is the phrasing used two paragraphs earlier on the same page discussing the argument put 
forward on behalf of the plaintiff. 
111  Ibid 430–1 (Austin J). 
112  Ibid 631 (Austin J). 
113  (1986) 11 ACLR 94. 
114  Ibid 96. 
115  Ibid. 
116  ENT v Sunraysia (2007) 61 ACSR 626, 636 (Austin J). 
117  Conaglen, above n 10, 201–2 n 140. 
118  (2010) 81 ACSR 262. 
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Court states that the ‘directors owe a fiduciary duty to members to give them full 
information of all matters material to the business that is to be transacted at a 
company meeting’.119 Surprisingly given the discussion above, the Court declares 
that this duty is fully stated in Bulfin v Bebarfald’s case.120 
The Court concludes that the information must be sufficient to allow 
members to determine whether they would attend the meeting in order to vote, 
following Fraser v NRMA with no further discussion.121 Two assumptions make 
this duty relevant on the facts: first, that an administrator is under the same duty 
to advise creditors when convening a meeting as a director would be when 
convening a meeting of members, and secondly, that the duty arises whether or 
not the administrator is urging a particular approach.122 The Court proceeds on the 
basis that both assumptions are an accurate statement of the legal position, but 
acknowledges that ‘[n]either assumption is self-evidently correct. Rather, there is 
good reason to think that the opposite is the true position’.123 Unfortunately for 
the development of the law in this area, as these two assumptions were not put in 
issue before the Court, neither the assumptions nor the underlying ‘fiduciary duty 
of disclosure’ are fully articulated in the resulting judgment. 
 
C   Blackmagic Design v Overliese 
The following year in an appeal before the Full Federal Court the question of 
a fiduciary duty of disclosure is raised again. Blackmagic Design v Overliese124 
considers, in part, whether two employees of the appellant company are in breach 
of their employment obligations by failing to disclose their development of a 
product which competed with the business of the appellant company.125 This 
judgment provides the logic to harmonise the preceding cases with the authority 
provided by the High Court, and whilst soundly dismissing the possibility of a 
positive fiduciary duty of disclosure, emphasises the use of the defence of fully 
informed consent. 
Besanko J, for the Court, notes that before the trial judge and in its notice of 
appeal, the appellant appears to base its claim for equitable compensation from 
the first respondent on an alleged breach of fiduciary obligation to disclose the 
details of their product to their employer. The trial judge rejects this claim on the 
basis that fiduciary obligations are proscriptive, not prescriptive.126 Consequently, 
some creative linguistics were required on appeal to circumvent the language in 
the pleadings, which led to the appellant submitting that  
                                                 
119  Ibid 272 (Finkelstein J). 
120  Ibid. 
121  Ibid. 
122  Ibid. 
123  Ibid. 
124  (2011) 191 FCR 1. 
125  Ibid 4–6 (Besanko J). 
126  Ibid 6. 
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the … respondents had placed themselves in a position of conflict of interest and duty and that disclosure of that conflict – and that meant the details of [the product] – was required.127 
During his Honour’s discussions as to whether the claim for equitable 
compensation could succeed, he directly addresses the question as to whether 
there was a fiduciary duty to disclose, or whether it was more correctly ascribed 
as a defence to a claim of breach.128 
On one view there is no duty to disclose a conflict and when judges refer to a duty to disclose in this context it is no more than a shorthand way of referring to the defence of fully informed consent by the principal. As I have said, the law in Australia is that fiduciary duties are proscriptive and not prescriptive. On this view the breach of fiduciary duty is the conduct of the fiduciary in placing himself in a position of conflict. Disclosure is simply a means of avoiding a breach, not a duty. The loss which is recoverable by way of equitable compensation on this view is that which would not have occurred if the conflict had not arisen and not the loss which would not have occurred had disclosure been made.129  
His Honour cites a number of sources which favoured the view that 
disclosure is a defence and not a positive duty. 130  He then turns to the 
counterargument: 
The other view is that the duty is not to act in conflict without the informed consent of the principal and that there are many decisions of high authority where the courts have said that there is a duty of disclosure in circumstances of a conflict of interest and duty.131  
Quite succinctly, Besanko J resolves the issue: 
It seems to me the first view is the correct one. It seems to me to be the orthodox approach because there is undoubtedly a breach when the fiduciary places himself or herself in a position of conflict. The breach is excused or perhaps does not arise if the principal consents. In other words, it is not enough that there be disclosure, there must be consent. Disclosure is part of a defence.132 
This seems to correctly categorise the outcome: ‘a shorthand way of referring 
to the defence of fully informed consent’133 has been misinterpreted as creating a 
fiduciary duty of disclosure. This accords with previous Federal Court 
interpretation of the judgment of Brennan J in Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange 
Ltd 134  on the defence of fully informed consent. That judgment has been 
                                                 
127  Ibid. The argument as to a breach of fiduciary obligation was limited to the first respondent, as a senior 
employee, whereas the claim in relation to the other employee was for common law damages based on an 
alleged breach of a ‘disclosure of conflict of interest’ term in his written contract of employment. 
128  Ibid 22–3. 
129  Ibid 22 (emphasis in original). 
130  Ibid, citing National Mutual Property Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Citibank Savings Ltd [1998] FCA 
564; L S Sealy, ‘Some Principles of Fiduciary Obligation’ (1963) 21 Cambridge Law Journal 119; Finn, 
‘The Fiduciary Principle’, above n 10; John Glover, Commercial Equity – Fiduciary Relationships 
(Butterworths, 1995). 
131  Blackmagic Design v Overliese (2011) 191 FCR 1, 22–3. His Honour goes on to cite a number of 
supporting cases: Tracy v Mandalay Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 215; BLB Corporation of Australia 
Establishment v Jacobsen (1974) 48 ALJR 372; Walden Properties Ltd v Beaver Properties Pty Ltd 
[1973] 2 NSWLR 815. 
132  Blackmagic Design v Overliese (2011) 191 FCR 1, 23. 
133  Ibid 22 (Besanko J). 
134  (1986) 160 CLR 371. 
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interpreted as imposing expansive, prescriptive obligations of disclosure on the 
part of the fiduciary.135 Austin J concludes in Aequitas v AEFC that Brennan J 
was not prescribing further duties, but merely referring to the contractual aspects 
of the adviser-client relationship raised by that case, and explaining the nature of 
disclosure required of the fiduciary in order to satisfy the defence.136 A similar 
conclusion is reached by Finkelstein J in Fitzwood Pty Ltd v Unique Goal Pty Ltd 
(in liq)137 when he refuses to describe the obligation to seek informed consent as a 
positive duty but instead describes it as a ‘means by which the fiduciary obtains 
the release or forgiveness of a negative duty’.138 
Should further clarity still be required, obiter dicta by their Honours in 
Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell,139 a case regarding an oral contact of employment with 
subsequent written terms and so not directly on point here, is still of assistance. 
When considering whether the employee ought to have disclosed prior 
misconduct to their employer, and the speech of Lord Atkin in Bell v Lever 
Brothers Ltd 140  on that point, their Honours raise an exception ‘to allow for 
obligations of disclosure which attend a fiduciary duty, if informed consent is to 
be obtained to what otherwise would be a breach of that duty’. 141  Careful 
phrasing avoids declaring the disclosure to be a fiduciary duty itself, but instead 
states it as an obligation which attends disclosure if the fiduciary wishes to obtain 
consent in order to avoid being guilty of breach. 
 
D   Conclusions on the Duty of Disclosure 
To add further doubt to the matter, none of the cases which support the 
concept of a ‘fiduciary duty of disclosure’ undertake the essential initial step of 
finding a fiduciary relationship between the directors and any beneficiary. 
Although the company is the beneficiary of fiduciary obligations, that first step is 
vital to a discussion of the obligation, as, in the circumstances before the Court, 
the shareholders acting in their capacity as an organ of the company were entitled 
to grant fully informed consent.142 It is rather hard to understand how a director 
can owe a ‘fiduciary duty’ of any nature without first having been established as 
a fiduciary with obligations flowing to some ascertainable beneficiary. The path 
of reasoning within these judgments would suggest that a director can owe a 
‘fiduciary duty’ without first being found to be a fiduciary.143 That cannot be 
reconciled with the prophylactic nature of the fiduciary obligation. 
Finally, it is important to be clear that this is not simply a case of semantics. 
It does make a difference to declare a fiduciary duty to disclose, rather than 
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acknowledge disclosure as one step within the defence of fully informed consent. 
To reiterate the findings of Besanko J in Blackmagic Design v Overliese,  
‘[t]he breach is excused or perhaps does not arise if the principal consents. In 
other words, it is not enough that there be disclosure, there must be consent. 
Disclosure is part of a defence’.144 To describe only a fiduciary duty to disclose 
inappropriately ignores that element of consent from the beneficiary of the duty, 
without which there is still breach. Equally, this description curtails the 
fiduciary’s rights as well, as the defence permits absolution for a breach already 
committed,145 which is not something that appears to be contemplated within a 
duty of disclosure, fiduciary or not. 
 
VI   CONCLUSION 
Although the relationship of director and company is an accepted category of 
relationship in which fiduciary obligations are presumed to be owed,146 not all 
duties and obligations owed by the director to the company will be fiduciary in 
nature. Some will exist at common law, some in equity, and only a subset of 
those equitable obligations will be fiduciary in nature. This does not include a 
duty of disclosure, which is more properly seen as an element of the defence of 
fully informed consent. It is unfortunate that mistakes in assigning labels to these 
duties abound, as the determination of the nature of a particular obligation is 
important because of the differing rules relating to causation, remoteness, 
limitation periods and remedies available.147  
The outcome that a duty to disclose does not exist within fiduciary law is not 
an argument against the utility of fiduciary obligations within the corporate 
sphere. Although fiduciary obligations have often been overlooked as a source of 
corporate governance in the past,148 it is clear that in certain circumstances, the 
courts are willing to recognise them as a method of controlling authority 
exercised within companies. The reticence to rely on fiduciary obligations is 
perhaps because they are subject to exclusion or variation via contract, 149  or 
because the obligations are not intended to advance performance ‘except in the 
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specific sense that self-regard must not compromise the undertaking’.150 The fact 
that they are couched in proscriptive language does not prevent fiduciary 
obligations from contributing to corporate governance through both their 
deterrent and disclosure effects. Furthermore, the defence requires the best kind 
of disclosure for good corporate governance – pertinent, timely and not designed 
to overwhelm the beneficiary – because it is that disclosure which is necessary to 
achieve fully informed consent. The description of the fiduciary obligation as 
being ‘imposed by private law, but its function is public, and its purpose social’151 
and as ‘a pragmatic communal response to the corrosive mischief of 
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